Overall, the sentiment expressed was one of long-term concern, not immediate crisis. Participants highlighted a weakening of the institutional foundations of the global economic order - especially those historically anchored by the United States. Multilateralism, central bank independence and predictable trade policy are all seen as under pressure. While systemic failure is not anticipated, confidence in the current framework is eroding. What optimism remains is fragile and based on bilateral relationships rather than global in nature. The world is likely to become more fragmented.
A number of points were mentioned repeatedly in the meetings. These can be collated and summarised under the following headings:
1. US trade and financial policy are seen as having shifted from multilateralism to bilateralism. The Trump administration’s imposition of reciprocal tariffs on approximately 60 trading partners - including traditional allies such as the EU and Japan - and its efforts to extract bilateral deals reflect this shift. The US threat to withdraw from the IMF underscores the new administration’s broader rejection of post-war institutional arrangements. However, whilst there are some general themes, the detail of the decision making process appears fickle, naive and reactive - such as the temporary pause in tariffs following bond market volatility - rather than strategically planned.
2. Institutions once viewed as anchors of global stability are now seen as vulnerable. The Federal Reserve’s independence is under threat and this will be tested in coming weeks as court cases determine the administration’s legal right to remove heads of Senate-appointed organisations. The IMF’s credibility is under pressure from the US’s ambivalence towards its role, raising doubts about its ability to mobilise dollar liquidity in a crisis. Uncertainty around dollar swap lines - a key backstop during previous crises - illustrates how essential policy tools are becoming politicised.
3. Other countries are perceived to be reducing their reliance on US systems and patronage. China continues to seek deeper relationships with other Asian powers and Europe is also considering ways in which it can diversify its trade relationships. Europe is increasing defence spending but reconsidering procurement channels, as US security guarantees have in a short space of time become less reliable. Many countries and regions are exploring opportunities for closer ties with countries other than the US as global supply chains shift and historical loyalties are questioned. These actions reflect fragmented but widespread adaptation to a less predictable global order. These moves are not yet revolutionary but represent incremental, cautionary positioning against increasing US unpredictability.
4. While the US dollar remains central to trade finance and reserves, its role is diminishing and this trend is likely to be encouraged by the administration’s actions. Suggestions that the US might tax foreign holders of Treasuries or limit swap line access undermine confidence in the neutrality and reliability of dollar-based institutions. Although no rival currency currently matches the dollar’s liquidity or institutional depth, central banks and sovereign investors are beginning to explore alternatives more seriously.
5. The trade policy measures are driven by domestic political considerations and ideological thinking rather than hard economic analysis. Tariff levels, whether the proposed universal 10% or bespoke reciprocal country rates, have been shaped less by economic logic than as a crude tool to extract concessions from trading partners. However, the administration lacks the personnel and institutional capacity to manage bilateral trade negotiations with all trade partners at once and this is compounding the uncertainty. This has caused markets to question the integrity of the US as an economic partner resulting in reduced confidence in US assets. The actions of the new US administration have in a short space of time reduced the credibility of the US in terms of its international standing. Even if the policies were immediately reversed – which does not seem likely - it would take some time for confidence to return and credibility to be restored.
6. The emerging environment was presented as defined by drift rather than collapse. Coordination is weakening, institutions are under strain, and strategic responses remain fragmented. The result is a multipolar, more volatile system, shaped by a semi-permanent increase in uncertainty and a slowly emerging economic power vacuum where once the US stood strong. While the old order has not ended, its coherence is visibly fraying.